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This Essay on the distribution right considers the possibility and
the merits of three options now widely discussed. These are: (a) ex-
tending the reach of an old right, the right of reproduction, to include
the currently debated droit de destination,' or (b) broadening the right
of distribution in nations that have such a right by cutting back on the
"first sale doctrine"' 2 and other limitations on that right, and (c) giving
authors broad control over use of their work. All of these approaches
aim to make authors' rights more substantial and effective to achieve
their purpose amid the erosions resulting from technological change. In
pursuing this aim we must look carefully at the law and experience of
today as evolved from the past. "Historic continuity with the past,"
said Justice Holmes, "is not a duty, it is only a necessity."3 If we are to
help develop the law wisely for authors, it also will be necessary to look
at the problems, implications, and potentialities of the three options
described in a number of specific areas of the arts.
Because United States copyright law,4 in addition to granting a re-
production right, expressly provides for a right of distribution,5 I will
begin my review of the United States law and its problems with an ex-
amination of that provision. So let me first briefly describe the terms of
the United States distribution right and the limitations on it, including
the first sale doctrine and other restrictions, as well as some of the ex-
isting avenues of expansion or avoidance. It seems best to start by ex-
amining the language of the general right currently in force and its
history. Such a foundation will anchor and clarify any discussion of the
merits and demerits of United States law and put suggestions for
change in a sharper perspective.
II. THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
Section 106(3) of the United States Copyright Act of 1976 grants to
the copyright owner of a particular creative work the exclusive right "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
1. See Desurmont, The Author's Right to Control the Destination of Copies Reproducing
His Work, 134 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR [R.I.DA.] 2 (1987), reprinted in 12
CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 481 (1988). The "droit de destination" envisaged by M. Desurmont
would "provide authors with the means of controlling, in the broadest sense the conditions gov-
erning use by a buyer of the copies whose ownership he has acquired." Id. at 4, reprinted in 12
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 481-82.
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982); see also infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
3. W. AUDEN & L. KRONENBERGER, THE VIKING BOOK OF APHORISMs 231 (1962) (quoting O.W.
Holmes, Jr.).
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982). For an excellent article on the distribution right, see gener-
ally Desurmont, supra note 1.
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by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."'
These words should be read with care and attention to several signifi-
cant points about this very broad language.
First it refers, not to the author, but to the copyright owner, who
may be the author, the author's heir, or any one to whom the author's
title to the copyright, or to some element of it, is transferred whether
by sale, gift, will, operation of law, or otherwise. In United States law,
author may mean an employer in many circumstances. 7 In other words,
the holder of the distribution right may be someone remote from the
actual creator of the work in question. Section 106(3), like the rest of
the Copyright Act, was not drawn with traditional droits moraux in
mind.'
Second, notice that section 106(3) speaks of distribution to the
public. Thus it encompasses a right of first publication or disclosure of
the copyrighted work,9 as well as some right of control over the disposi-
tion of objects embodying the work and the dissemination of those ob-
jects. We meet here the very basic and commonly observed distinction
between the creative work and the tangible object in which it appears, a
distinction preserved in section 202 of the United States law, which will
be discussed later.10 Both the legislative history and, recently, the
United States Supreme Court have recognized expressly that section
106(3) does accord a first publication right in some measure." Whether
6. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982).
7. Id. § 201(b). For a definition of "work made for hire," see id. § 101 (stating that with a
work made for hire, the employer for whom the work is prepared is considered the author).
8. For an excellent discussion on droits moraux, see Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral
Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465 (1968). M. Sarraute
defines the moral right of authors as including "non-property attributes of an intellectual and
moral character which give legal expression to the intimate bond which exists between a literary or
artistic work and its author's personality; it is extended to protect his personality as well as his
work." Id. at 465. He further states:
ITihe moral right is generally composed of four aspects:
(1) The right of disclosure (divulgation);
Then, after the work has been made public and the author's rights to it have been
transferred:
(2) The right to withdraw or disavow;
(3) The right of paternity-i.e., the right to have one's name and authorship recognized;
(4) The right of integrity of the work of art.
Id. at 467.
Various United States doctrines, including rights of privacy or publicity, or the law of defama-
tion or unfair competition, especially under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982),
can yield results comparable to those reached under droits moraux in a number of situations.
9. See Kernochan, Protection of Unpublished Works in the United States Before and Af-
ter the Nation Case, 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 322 (1986) (analyzing and criticizing the limited
nature of the § 106(3) first publication right in present United States law as compared with the
first publication right in earlier United States law and with the French droit de divulgation).
10. See infra notes 28, 29, and accompanying text.
11. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985); H.R. REP.
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the use of the explicit phrase "to the public" denies the author a right
of limited publication or private restricted distribution has not been
fully and clearly determined. My guess is that the answer is "no," at
least if there is no transfer of title to the object in which the work is
embodied.12
Third, notice the language "or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending." This language does not appear in the 1909
Copyright Act which gave only a "right to vend."1 The broader scope
of the 1976 Act is significant, even if only as a clarification.
One may ask why, if the reproduction right may be construed as
broadly as the destination right proponents urge, the United States,
Germany, and other countries would have thought it necessary to add a
specific distribution right.14 A possible reason, for the United States at
least, may have been a fear that without this addition United States
courts might not grant copyright owners adequate control over their
own copies or over copies that were reproduced with their consent if,
for example, such copies were wrongfully in the hands of another."5
What section 106(3) seems to give so generously in delineating the
distribution right, however, section 109(a) withdraws in large measure.
Section 109(a) sets out what has become known as the first sale doc-
trine and applies that doctrine to limit substantially the distribution
right granted in section 106(3): "Notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tion 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is enti-
tled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."' 6 The phrasing
of this provision gives rights to owners of objects, copies, or pho-
norecords, in which copyrighted works are embodied, and to persons
authorized by owners. Owners may sell or give away the copies of books
or recordings they buy or may authorize someone to do these things.
The first sale doctrine is plainly a misleading label for what section
109(a) provides because one can become an owner by means other than
sale or purchase including gift, will, or operation of law. But observe
now that the owner has the section 109(a) right described only if the
object in question is lawfully made and does not constitute or contain
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5675-
76; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58.
12. Cf. 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11(A) (1988). For further
discussion of this topic, see 1 id. § 4.13.
13. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), (d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (repealed 1978).
14. See Desurmont, supra note 1.
15. See 2 M. NIMmER & D. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.11.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
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what amounts to an infringing, piratical, or otherwise forbidden repro-
duction or performance of a copyrighted work as defined by other pro-
visions of the 1976 Copyright Act.17
That section 109(a) expressly limits or exhausts section 106(3) pro
tanto is clear both from its initial words and from the phrase indicating
that the right it gives is applicable whether or not the copyright owner
consents. Here again copyright owners, not necessarily authors, are the
focus of concern. The traditional droits moraux are still far from the
minds of the draftsmen.18 Finally, and especially, take note that the
privilege given in section 109(a) is "to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession" of the object in question. It is curious that this language
does not coincide with that of section 106(3) which extends the distri-
bution right not only to sale or other transfer of ownership but also to
"rental, lease, or lending." Does the failure to specify "rental, lease, or
lending" in section 109(a) mean that these activities are not covered?
One commentator has suggested that section 109(a) should be read in
this manner and does not permit commercial rentals, leases, or loans.' 9
But the legislative history and the tide of informed opinion seem to run
the other way and to confirm that "otherwise dispose of the possession"
includes rental, lease, or lending, commercially or otherwise, and even a
right to destroy. 0 The notion that a wealthy collector owning one of the
world's great paintings has the unqualified right to destroy it under this
provision is a chilling one, even though that may also be the law in a
number of countries other than the United States.
The first sale or, better, the first transfer of ownership doctrine in
section 109(a) cannot be read apart from section 109(d), which provides
that without the copyright owner's consent "any person who has ac-
quired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner,
17. See 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.12(B)(4), (D).
18. See supra note 8.
19. See generally Colby, The First Sale Doctrine-The Defense That Never Was?, 32 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 77 (1984).
20. See Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029, and S. 32
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. & 2d Sess. 366-67 (1983-1984) [hereinafter First
Sale Doctrine Hearings] (prepared statement of Dorothy Schrader, Associate Register of Copy-
rights for Legal Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office) (discussing the pros and cons of the commercial
lending right and noting the existence of a right to destroy); Audio and Video Rental: Hearing on
S. 32 and S. 33 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-24 (1983) [hereinafter Audio and Video Rental
Hearing] (prepared statement of David Ladd, Register of Copyrights and Assistant Librarian for
Copyright Services, Library of Congress) (arguing in support of a commercial lending right and
noting the current right of purchasers to destroy their works); H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 11,
at 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5693 (noting that the right to dispose
of a copy includes the right to destroy).
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by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it" is
not considered an owner and is not accorded the first sale privileges of
an owner under section 109(a).2 1 The effect of this provision is to clarify
the meaning of "owner" in section 109(a); passage of title to the posses-
sor is required before the possessor is an "owner" for whose benefit the
distribution right is neutralized or exhausted. While the phrase in sec-
tion 109(d) about acquiring possession of the object from the copyright
owner at first glance might be thought to have a narrowing effect, it
seems clear that no such effect was intended. Section 109(d) and the
legislative history in both houses of Congress plainly state that section
109(a) privileges, even after the first transfer of title, do not apply to
someone who merely possesses the object without having acquired own-
ership.22 In this, as in the other respects, the 1976 Copyright Act is far
more explicit, clear, and detailed in its codification of the first sale right
than the 1909 Act, which simply stated that "nothing in this Act shall
be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully ob-
tained."2 3 Clearly, a copyright owner's rental of an unsold film now does
not permit the party to whom it is rented to transgress the broad distri-
bution right of section 106(3). In sum, the present so-called first sale
doctrine operates to nullify the distribution right when the copyright
owner transfers title to the object containing the work, but not when he
or she engages only in rental, lease, lending, or bailment of the object.
Before examining other actual or potential expansions and limita-
tions of the United States distribution right, let us look at the origins
and rationale of the first sale doctrine of section 109(a), which cuts so
broad a swath in authors' control over the use of their work. The so-
called first sale doctrine originated in general English common-law rules
of ancient ancestry disapproving restraints on the alienation of owned
property. 4 The right of alienation was viewed as a basic element of
ownership. It was founded on policies favoring the free transferability
of land and, more particularly, goods.25 Although over the centuries ma-
21. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (Supp. V 1987).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 11, at 80, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN.
NEWS at 5694 (discussing § 109(c), which was redesignated § 109(d) by Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat.
1727 (1984)); S. REP. No. 473, supra note 11, at 73.
23. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084, 1082 (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d
Cir. 1988).
25. See, e.g., John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907), cert. dismissed,
212 U.S. 588 (1908). The court stated:
A prime objection to the enforcibility [sic] of such a system of restraint upon sales and prices
is that they offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels or articles
which pass by mere delivery.
The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in
1412 [Vol. 42:1407
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jor inroads were made on these common-law rules in respect to real
property, the rules continue to dominate in the realm of personal prop-
erty, again in particular, chattels.26
Early United States copyright laws from 1790 to 1909 gave the
copyright owner the "right to vend" his work but omitted specific refer-
ence to other types of transfer of ownership or to rental, lease, lending,
or bailment.2 7 As the years passed, the courts distinguished between the
copyright owner's rights in a copyrighted work and the rights of the
person owning the material object in which the work was embodied.
Indeed the first sale doctrine cannot be understood apart from that dis-
tinction, which was codified along with the first sale doctrine in the
1909 law and, later, in section 109(a) and (d) and in section 202 of the
1976 Act.28 These provisions include language to the effect that a trans-
fer of ownership of an object does not carry with it, unless by virtue of
an express writing to that effect, ownership of the copyright in the work
embodied in the object concerned. In the nineteenth century United
States courts began to apply the time-honored common-law rules for
personal property disfavoring restraints on alienation by owners of ob-
jects embodying copyrighted works. They generally did not, however,
deprive the copyright owners of their special copyright rights, notably
the crucial exclusive rights of reproduction and performance, unless
these were ceded expressly.29 The United States statutes, with some
movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public
policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to
hand.. . . A covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run with or attach itself
to a mere chattel.
Id. at 39.
26. For a history and critique of these rules, see Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels,
41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928) [hereinafter Chafee, Equitable Servitudes] and Chafee, The Music
Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1250 (1956) [herein-
after Chafee, The Music Goes Round]. In the latter article, the author notes: "Where chattels are
involved and not just land or a business, the policy in favor of mobility creates even stronger cause
for courts to hesitate and scrutinize carefully factors of social desirability before imposing novel
burdens on property in the hands of transferees." Id. at 1261.
27. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), (d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (repealed 1978); Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat.
436, 436 (repealed 1870); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
28. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), (d), 202 (1982); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (re-
pealed 1978). Section 202 provides:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from
ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any
material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of
itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of
an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a
copyright convey property rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202.
29. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908); Red Baron-Franklin Park,
Inc. v. Taito Corp., 11 U.S. P.Q.2d 1548 (4th Cir. 1989); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd
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embellishment and revision, followed the lead of the courts. This devel-
opment poses a fascinating question: If this practice was wise at one
time, is it wise today as a matter of social and economic policy?
In his famous, invaluable studies of equitable servitudes on chat-
tels, the late Professor Chafee reviewed the history and merits of the
rules forbidding restraints on alienation in their various applications."0
Noting the many exceptions developed in the area of real property, he
suggested that the old rules should not be considered immutable and
that changing business circumstances might, in some cases, justify ex-
ceptions in connection with personal property when sound public poli-
cies would be served thereby."1 In his review of the cases involving
chattels, some in the copyright area, he found few instances in which
application of the no-restraint rule was not preferable on the merits,
after a weighing of pertinent policy factors.2 We will return to this
question later, but Professor Chafee's open-minded views can serve as a
useful guide in this and future discussions regarding limits and exten-
Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1984); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 11, at 79,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5693. See generally 2 M. NIMMER & D.
NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.12(D); cf. Nolan, All Rights Not Reserved After the First Sale, 23
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S-A 76 (1975) (discussing the 1909 Act).
30. See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes, supra note 26; Chafee, The Music Goes Round, supra
note 26. In his later article, Professor Chafee summed up his conclusions as follows:
In 1928 I indulged in speculations on the validity of equitable servitudes on chattels.
Although I concluded that such servitudes were "a reasonable and flexible device, which the
courts might use when desirable," it was then plain that judges were looking with disfavor on
the two chief ways in which businessmen had attempted to impose obligations on successive
owners of personal property. . . . [T]hese devices [i.e., resale price maintenance and tying
restraints] were held invalid by 1928 on the ground that they would restrain trade unreasona-
bly. With these two types gone, very little was left. My article pointed out a few stray deci-
sions of miscellaneous sorts where restrictions had been enforced, and a few more
hypothetical situations which might not encounter judicial objections.
Id. at 1254 (footnotes omitted).
31. See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes, supra note 26, at 946-48, 983.
32. Chafee observed:
The big point is that the imposition of a novel burden, either on land or a chattel or both,
ought not to depend solely on the will of the parties. The validity or invalidity of the burden
they want to create ought to depend on considerations of public policy. Do business needs
make it desirable to create this novel burden? Does its enforcement involve such grave pos-
sibilities of annoyance, inconvenience, and useless expenditure of money that it should not be
allowed? In other words, is the game worth the candle?...
After all, when you come to look at equitable servitudes, which have developed during
less than two centuries, it is an extraordinary thing for the law to enforce them at all. They
are in marked contrast with the strong legal rules against restraints on alienation.
Chafee, The Music Goes Round, supra note 26, at 1258 (footnote omitted).
Some of the cases involving copyright that Chafee considered were RCA Mfg. Co. v. White-
man, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 279




sions of the distribution right.
III. SOME OTHER LIMITATIONS ON THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT
Present United States copyright law imposes other important limi-
tations, aside from the first sale doctrine of section 109(a), on the distri-
bution right. Section 108 gives libraries the privilege to reproduce and
distribute copyrighted works, excluding generally music and art, under
certain circumstances.33 Another limitation is the treatment of the
transmission of copyrighted works authorized in sections 110 and 111,
the latter including rights under compulsory licensing for cable televi-
sion. 4 Other distributions are expressly allowed under the head of
"ephemeral recordings" in section 112,31 in section 113 for pictures and
photographs of useful articles, 6 and in section 114(b) for sound record-
ings included in educational television or radio programs but excluding
commercial distribution to the general public.3 7 Section 114(b) is am-
biguous with respect to the distribution rights of the owner of copyright
in a sound recording in relation to recordings that imitate or simulate,
rather than duplicate. But the compulsory license for public broadcast-
ing allows some limited distribution rights to the licensee.
Most important, however, are the mechanical and rental compul-
sory licenses in section 115.38 This section sharply poses a recurring
question about the first sale doctrine: To what extent is the copyright
owner's consent to transfer of title required to make the holder of a
copy or phonorecord, lawfully made, an "owner" entitled to the privi-
leges of section 109(a)? For example, when the manufacturer of the ob-
ject, contrary to agreement, has not been paid by the copyright owner,
may he sell under section 109(a) if state law permits it? What of one
who acquires the object via bankruptcy proceedings? Can the holder of
a compulsory mechanical license sell, without the copyright owner's
consent, the records he or she has lawfully made? The language of sec-
tion 109(a) 9 suggests the answer to this last question is "yes." More-
over, the legislative history flatly states that "the disposition of a
phonorecord legally made under the compulsory licensing provisions of
section 115 would not [be an infringement]."40 Similar is the compul-
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
34. See id. §§ 110-111 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
35. See id. § 112 (1982).
36. See id. § 113.
37. See id. § 114(b).
38. See id. § 115 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
39. This language refers to "the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made." See id. §
109(a) (1982).
40. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 11, at 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5693; S. REP. No. 473, supra note 11, at 72.
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sory license situation under section 115(c)(3) relating to rental.41 Fi-
nally, the last paragraph of section 117 limits the distribution of copies
the law allows to be made in the utilization of a computer program by
one who is not the copyright owner. It also bars the distribution, with-
out consent, of any adaptation, even one lawfully made, in the same
circumstances.42
Thus it can be seen that the right of distribution is limited by a
number of provisions other than the drastic limitation of section 109(a).
More important practical limitations are imposed today by new repro-
duction technologies of photocopying and taping used by private or in-
stitutional entities, whether or not sanctioned by fair use, another
major source of limitation. Private copying and distribution of objects
containing copyrighted material, by devices available even in the home,
have passed beyond the control of the copyright owner. Other actual or
potential incursions on the distribution right and other authors' rights
include the eleventh amendment's immunization of state governments
and their institutions from federal court suits4 3 and other legal doc-
trines that may render other uses of copyrighted material
noninfringing.
44
IV. AVOIDING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
If the picture drawn so far seems very dark now for those of us who
wish to see the author's control extended, it is necessary to recognize a
number of existing legal provisions or avenues of action that may re-
store some ground otherwise lost to the distribution right. In appraising
these, it is desirable to reflect that the distribution right unlike any of
the other exclusive enumerated rights purely is a right to control use,
and not a right based on reproduction or any of its analogues of per-
formance, display, or adaptation. The more closely an author's rights or
copyright approach a right of control over use, whether via the repro-
duction right or droit de destination" or via expanding the present
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
42. See id. § 117 (1982). The last paragraph of § 117 reads as follows:
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be
leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were pre-
pared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adapta-
tions so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
Id.
43. This immunization hinders owners from enforcing their rights, because copyright actions
may only be brought in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982).
44. See, e.g., Kernochan, Music Performing Rights Organizations in the United States of
America: Special Characteristics; Restraints; and Public Attitudes, 21 COPYRIGHT 389, 394-406
(1985) (monthly review of the World Intellectual Property Organization), reprinted in 10 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 333, 345-70 (1986).
45. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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right of distribution, then the more they take on the character and
scope of patent protection. The United States patent law's comprehen-
sive grant of monopoly over use is hedged strictly by a number of limi-
tations designed to redress the balance in favor of competition and
dissemination: strict standards and scrutiny before any grant, a much
shorter term of protection, and disclosure requirements. 6 I believe it is
right to increase copyright control over use in an era when technology
has made obsolete or unworkable in many areas the author's traditional
reliance on control over copying and its analogues to secure compensa-
tion for, and earn a livelihood from, his or her work. Once we create for
authors a new basis such as use for compensation, we must step care-
fully and define the new area of use monopoly with caution and reason-
ableness, with an effort at precision, and with consideration for the
legitimate countervailing interests of intermediaries and the public. We
must weigh the interests of competition and avoid imposing unneces-
sary transaction costs.
A. Imports
The distribution right granted in section 106(3), and severely lim-
ited by the first sale doctrine in section 109(a) and by other provisions,
nonetheless may be affected by section 602(a).47 This section, with some
exceptions, forbids importation into the United States, without the au-
thority of the United States copyright owner, of copies or phonorecords
of works acquired outside the United States. 48 Such importation is said
to infringe the section 106(3) distribution right. Some United States
district courts read section 602(a) to give copyright owners a special
additional right to bar importation of a work already distributed with
the authority of the United States copyright owner.49 Such an addi-
tional right would be a significant supplement to the section 106(3)
right. This reading of section 602(a) does not represent a unanimous
view and the trend seems against it. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit decided that there was a second and preferable reading that
harmonized sections 602(a) and 109(a).5 0 Under this reading, section
602(a) merely provides a specific reference to another situation in which
the distribution right is, as elsewhere, subject to section 109(a)'s limit-
ing force, at least when what is in issue is not the importing of copies
46. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1982).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575 (D.N.J. 1987); Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), afl'd
mem., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
50. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
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produced and sold abroad under a territorially restricted license.5' This
result leaves section 602(a) little, if any, effect as an extension of the
distribution right defined by sections 106(3) and 109, except in cases of
piracy.52 The validity of this latest approach seems very questionable to
me as a matter of construction and policy. The legislative history, how-
ever, is rather ambiguous on the effect of section 602(a) in nonpiracy
situations and contains material that could support either of the two
judicial positions. 3
B. Record Rental
If section 602(a)'s role is in doubt, the distribution right unques-
tionably was extended in the United States by adoption in 1984 of the
Record Rental Amendment54 now embodied in the 1976 Act's sections
109(b) and 115(c)(3). The Record Rental Amendment of 1984 enlarges
the section 106(3) distribution right by carving an exception out of the
first sale doctrine of section 109(a). It forbids the disposition of pho-
norecords for "direct or indirect commercial advantage . . . by rental,
lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental,
lease, or lending" without the consent of the copyright owner of the
sound recording and the copyright owner of the musical works it
embodies.5
Notice that this Amendment is drawn quite narrowly. The refer-
ence to musical works would seem to exclude recordings of literary or
dramatic works, and perhaps even dramatic works with music, without
51. See id. at 1097-99; see also Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., No. 88-0156-A
(E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1548 (4th Cir. 1989); Neutrogena
Corp. v. United States, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900 (D.S.C. 1988). Note that § 602(b) provides in pertinent
part: "In a case where the making of the copies or phonorecords would have constituted an in-
fringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation is prohibited." 17
U.S.C. § 602(b) (1982).
52. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 11, at 170, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5786 (stating that § 602(b) retains the prohibition against importation of piratical copies,
those whose making would have constituted an infringement if the title had been applicable).
53. Id. at 169-70, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5785-86 (reporting
that "[s]ection 602(a) first states the general rule that unauthorized importation is an infringement
merely if the copies or phonorecords 'have been acquired outside the United States' "); S. REP. No.
473, supra note 11, at 151-52 (making an almost identical statement). This rule would seem to
favor the view of the cases cited supra note 49. Later, the same sources say that § 602 applies
when the copies or phonorecords were lawfully made but their distribution in the United States
would infringe the United States copyright owner's exclusive rights as limited by § 109(a) to expire
on first sale anywhere.
54. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 115(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987)). This Amendment was enacted with the proviso that it
would expire in 1989 unless renewed before then. It has been renewed for another eight years by
the Record Rental Amendment Extension, Pub. L. No. 100-617, 102 Stat. 3194 (1988) (extending
the Record Rental Amendment of 1984 until Oct. 4, 1997).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
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sufficient reason. 6 Also, there is an express exception for rental, lease,
or lending for noncommercial purposes by a nonprofit library or non-
profit educational institution, and the language of section 109(b)(1) im-
plies that others too may engage in rental, lease, or lending of records in
the absence of "direct or indirect commercial advantage. '57 Moreover,
section 109(b)(1) encompasses only phonorecords of music and not cop-
ies of whatever nature. Finally, section 109(b)(3) specifies that only civil
penalties may be invoked against infringements under this 1984
Amendment.5 8 The related provisions of section 115(c)(3) supplement
section 109(b) on record rental by ensuring that the compulsory licen-
sees of the mechanical right in a recorded work may distribute by
rental, lease, or lending subject to payment of prescribed royalties to
the owner of the musical copyright in the work recorded.5
The circumstance that led to the proposal and passage of the Rec-
ord Rental Amendment was the threat that record rental businesses,
catering primarily to customers who rented recordings at low prices in
order to make home copies of the recordings for themselves or others,
would proliferate in the United States, depressing record sales se-
verely. 0 This threat had materialized in Japan and elsewhere." These
downstream businesses made substantial sums by renting records prin-
cipally used for home-taping, paid none of this money to the creator of
the recording or of the music, and reduced potential record sales sub-
stantially. The root difficulty in this area, and for copyright generally,
remains private copying, particularly home-taping. The Record Rental
Amendment addresses only one facet of this difficulty: the spread of
commercial rental outlets to assist home-taping. Home-taping continues
in any case on an ever-broadening scale in the United States, using
other sources, including phonorecords loaned by exempted libraries,62
broadcasts, and borrowed privately owned recordings. This problem is
the most damaging to authors. It is the one that most needs in depth
congressional consideration.
The Amendment slipped through the congressional processes due
56. The legislative history of the Record Rental Amendment of 1984 does not appear to set-
tle these questions of coverage. See generally H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2898; S. REP. No. 162, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). There
has not been any relevant case law to date.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
58. See id. § 109(b)(3).
59. See id. § 115(c)(3).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 987, supra note 56, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2899; S. REP. No. 162, supra note 56, at 2-3.
61. See S. RP. No. 162, supra note 56, at 2-3.
62. The statute expressly exempts libraries from the royalty payment requirement. See 17
U.S.C. § 115(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
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to a series of lucky coincidences.6 3 The accompanying legislative pro-
posals concerning video rental and more importantly audio and video
home-taping were less fortunate and have not been enacted. A major
factor in the 1984 Record Rental Amendment's passage was the lack of
effective opposing vested interests of the kind that blocked the accom-
panying audio and video legislative proposals. Relatively few record
rental establishments had taken root in the United States at the time of
the Amendment, and the Amendment did stop their spread. If rental
outlets had been as numerous in the United States as in Japan, and had
objected to the bill, it is quite likely, given the ease with which opposing
interest groups may block our congressional processes, that the Amend-
ment would not have become law.
This new restraint on alienation is justified, as are measures to dis-
courage or collect for video rental and audio or video home-taping, be-
cause unhampered alienation in this area erodes or destroys the basic
right of reproduction that is the core of the traditional copyright sys-
tem. In such a situation created by new technology, it would seem
that Professor Chafee would have approved as sound policy this legisla-
tive overriding of old common-law objections to restraints on the dispo-
sition of chattels.
C. Other Rentals, Leases, or Lending
There are other avenues, some noted earlier, by which the distribu-
tion right can be preserved or extended, or the first sale doctrine
avoided. One avenue by which the author or copyright owner can retain
control under the distribution right, defined by sections 106(3) and
109(a) and (d), is to restrict the methods of distribution of the objects
containing the work to rental, lease, loan, or bailment, thus avoiding
any transfer of title. This practice can be effective in certain arts areas
such as film, in which motion picture companies typically distribute
their product by leasing. To avoid problems great care must be taken to
assure that every transaction falls into the rental, lease, or lending cate-
gory and that none can be characterized as transferring title.6 5 More-
over, with sales of videocassettes increasing, this form of control is
possible only in narrowing circumstances or as a temporary measure.
63. For a fascinating account of the enactment of the Record Rental Amendment of 1984, see
Horowitz, The Record Rental Amendment of 1984: A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copy-
right Law to New Technology, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 31 (1987).
64. Id. at 68.
65. There are cases attesting to some of the difficulties that may arise in practice. See, e.g.,
United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying the doctrine of first sale under
the 1909 Act to transfers of films for television purposes); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180
(9th Cir. 1977) (discussing what constitutes a first sale under the 1909 Act).
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Under the shadow of the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax),66 and given the
existing strength of the videocassette rental industry, it has not been
possible to secure congressional approval of a video, as opposed to an
audio, rental amendment. Leakage, piracy, and off-the-air taping still
will take a high toll even if a pure rental system is pursued. In some
areas such a system may be unworkable.
D. Contractual Provisions
The congressional reports accompanying section 109(a) state ex-
pressly that the first sale doctrine "does not mean that conditions on
future disposition of copies or phonorecords, imposed by a contract be-
tween their buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the par-
ties as a breach of contract, but it does mean that they could not be
enforced by an action for infringement of copyright. ' 67 Thus, apart
from retention of title, contractual arrangements may stave off applica-
tion of the first sale doctrine and expand the right of distribution. One
can imagine scenarios in which a contract between A, the copyright
owner, and B, an intermediary or user or consumer, might restrict B's
rights, whether or not B holds title, to dispose by contract of the object
transferred. Further, a contract might require B to assure the subjec-
tion of any subsequent purchasers, from B onward, to a contractual
provision requiring that any later transfer must subject the transferee
to the restrictions binding B. In effect, the chattel would be saddled
with a restraint on use or disposal throughout any succeeding chain of
contracts. An analogy may be drawn to covenants running with the
land. This state of affairs is the very one the courts have sought to dis-
courage with their time-honored rules against restraints on alienation of
chattels. Thus, some judicial hostility can be expected. Indeed, to
strengthen that hostility, a number of the early cases dealing adversely
with contractual restraints on chattels involved anticompetitive re-
straints disfavored by antitrust policy, such as efforts to impose resale
price maintenance or tying arrangements.6 8 A fear that the Record
Rental Amendment of 1984 might give rise to anticompetitive conduct
by copyright owners of phonorecords led to the inclusion of section
109(b)(2), which expressly assures that whatever actions such owners
might take under section 109(b) are subject to antitrust standards.69
66. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
67. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 11, at 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5693 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 473, supra note 11, at 72.
68. See supra note 30.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (Supp. V 1987); H.R. REP. No. 987, supra note 56, at 5, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2899.
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If contracts may supplement the distribution right despite section
109(a), at least two cautionary observations must be made. The first is
the familiar one that contract rights in many cases may not be available
to copyright owners, especially authors, lacking bargaining power equal
to or greater than that of the other contracting party. Rights purport-
edly granted to an author can be useless unless the author has the bar-
gaining power to make them effective. 70 The second observation is that
even for a party with strong bargaining power, reliance on contract may
raise more problems than it solves. On this matter I recommend an ex-
cellent memorandum submitted by Peter Nolan, Senior Counsel for
Walt Disney Productions, at the 1983 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
Hearings on the audio and video rental bills.71 Mr. Nolan's memoran-
dum finds that the contract route is inadequate even for a party as
powerful as Disney. A key problem, of course, is the nonuniformity of
contract law in the fifty states. 3
E. Some General Observations
The distribution right also is subject to various countervailing
forces that beset United States copyright law including the first and
eleventh amendments, fair use, formalities, and the vagaries of the
standards and remedies for infringement. 74 The United States is not
even close to recognizing a droit de destination. Of four particularly
vital proposals relating to audio and video rental, and audio and video
home-taping, the United States has acted on only one, audio rental, and
that only in a limited way.75 The configurations of power necessary to
secure congressional action on the other three are at present wanting in
70. Boytha, The Development of Legislative Provisions on Authors' Contracts, 133 R.I.D.A.
41 (1987), reprinted in 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 155 (1988).
71. See Audio and Video Rental Hearing, supra note 20, at 92-104 (prepared memorandum
of Peter Nolan, Senior Counsel, Walt Disney Productions).
72. Referring particularly to videocassettes, Mr. Nolan concluded:
In sum, copyright owners cannot effectively prevent the unauthorized use of the copy-
righted videocassettes by contract under state law. Although a copyright owner could bind the
first purchaser of his videocassette to a restrictive use agreement, it may be legally impossible
for him to bind subsequent purchasers of that tape, and any attempt to do so would be a
highly inadequate means of providing himself with complete protection against the unautho-
rized uses of his works. Besides the fact that video retailers can easily avoid liability using
conventional contractual agreements, there also are significant burdens in administering,
monitoring, and enforcing these contracts under state law. A federal remedy which would
permit copyright holders to bring a copyright infringement action against those making unau-
thorized uses of videocassettes would alleviate most of these problems and provide copyright
owners with an effective means of securing compensation for the use of their works.
Id. at 104.
73. Id. at 94.
74. See generally Kernochan, supra note 44.
75. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
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such degree as to suggest these measures are a considerable distance
from realization. Better education and organization of authors, other
procopyright forces, and the public are needed urgently before we can
be truly hopeful of positive results. We are very far in the United States
from giving copyright owners a patent-style right over use.
V. DISTRIBUTING PARTICULAR TYPES OF WORKS
I now would like to examine some aspects of the distribution of
particular kinds of copyrighted works and speculate a little about some
of the ways in which we might justifiably consider extending the domin-
ion of the copyright owner or author into the very large territory en-
compassed by a comprehensive right of use. While this Essay has
sought to describe quite fully and accurately the United States right of
distribution and its limitations, I can only address and illustrate the
possible extensions of the right in a few areas. Each area that I will
discuss, and the many others I will not, would merit a paper on its own.
I have not dealt in any substantial way in this paper with the implica-
tions of either droits moraux (except the droit de divulgation discussed
below) or their United States analogies. 6 Nor have I been able to cover
the serious and urgent distribution right questions arising in the highly
complex area of computer programs and databases.77 Both of these sub-
jects are of great and pervasive importance and, with others, also de-
serve separate consideration in extenso.
A. Unpublished Works
As an initial step, I recommend strong provisions, a droit de divul-
gation in effect, protecting authors' exclusive rights to control their un-
published works of all kinds,7 except in extraordinary circumstances .7
Authors generally should have the power to decide whether, when, and
how their works are first released to the public. I see this power as a
fundamental right of individual autonomy and dignity in a free society,
76. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of these areas, see, e.g., Maher, The Shrink- Wrap License: Old Problems
in a New Wrapper, 34 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.SA 292 (1987); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988). Note that bills have been introduced in both houses of Con-
gress to accord computer programs the same protection in regard to rental that is accorded to
recordings of music in the Record Rental Amendment of 1984. See S. 2727, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
134 CONG. REc. S11,463 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (sponsored by Sen. Orrin Hatch); H.R. 1743,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 19, 1987) (sponsored by Rep. Patricia Schroeder). These are impor-
tant proposals that need weighing, with attention to the differences between many kinds of com-
puter programs and other kinds of literary and artistic property.
78. See generally Kernochan, supra note 9.
79. See, e.g., Goroff, Fair Use and Unpublished Works: Harper & Row v. Nation Enter-
prises, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 325, 346, 348-49 (1985).
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serving values that are embodied in the first amendment to the United
States Constitution and that are vital to free people everywhere. The
creation of speech must be protected and assured just as we protect its
utterance. Curiously, the Berne Convention does not mention this fun-
damental moral and economic right though one could argue that it is
assumed in Article 10.80 But we can agree perhaps that here the control
of use should be very extensive. In the United States, however, this con-
trol is less than it was before 1976. Again, a right of limited publication
for unpublished works, as afforded by United States common law
before 1976, sl seems necessary to protect the process of creation. Per-
haps legislative reform on unpublished works is possible in the United
States to regain territory lost in 1976.
B. Books
Authors' rights began in the area of published books. Within this
area, consider novels in particular. Once a novel is released to the pub-
lic, how far should the author be able to control its use? It seems doubt-
ful that the rental market for such books will become significant in the
near future, even though the United States version of the first sale doc-
trine leaves the copyright owner the right to opt for rentals only if that
is desired. 2 Of course, in the near future all marketing approaches
should be reconsidered as computers increasingly scan books into
databases and as computer terminals replace hand-held books for a
larger number of readers.8 If title to the object, as against its copy-
righted content, did not change hands, there would be no first sale and
the monitoring and regulation of the book's use in a database might be
the subject of fixed-term arrangements and engineered safeguards.
These ideas are speculative, and the risks of further loss of practical
control by authors in such circumstances are, as always, daunting. My
very limited gifts of prophecy falter before the possibilities of the future
in this area.
80. See The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, art. 10, as revised July 14, 1967, 102 Stat. 2853, T.I.A.S. No. -, at -. , 828 U.N.T.S.
221, 239.
81. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1978) (stating that
"nothing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such
unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor" (emphasis added)); see
also Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912) (approving author's right to bar publica-
tion of unpublished works).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Veliotes, Copyright in the 1980s-American Publishers Face a New Round of




For a while it seems that the primary market for books, novels at
least, and periodicals will continue to be the firsthand sale of copies.
How far into the area of use do we wish to extend the author's control
over a book once it is bought or validly owned by another? Strictly
speaking, total control of use would mean an ability to limit or prevent
reading, discussing, criticizing, quoting, selling, renting, lending, storing,
and exercising control over the copyright rights of recording, adapta-
tion, performance, computer input and retrieval, and the non-title-
transfer distribution that copyright law now imperfectly protects. It
seems obvious that even the most fanatical partisans of authors' rights
would be forced to exclude many of the first-listed senses of the im-
mensely broad word "use" in defining a "right to use" that would sat-
isfy a legislature or court of the reasonableness of the author's claim to
dominion. On the other hand, while the exclusions may change with
technology, for the present we may insist as a minimum that the pri-
mary sales market for novels and other books should continue to be
protected. For a novel, that market has many aspects, some of which we
may call print uses: first serial publication, hardcover edition, paper-
back editions of various types, second serial publication, book club dis-
tribution, abridgements and condensations, and quotations, together
with similar marketing in other countries, and in other languages. When
a novel has exhausted its appeal in the United States so that it does not
sell in significant quantity, it may be remaindered. Remaindering
means that the publisher sells off its remaining stock at a cheap price,
commonly below cost. In the area of print uses, the author arguably
should reap some share of the returns on all such traditional commer-
cial dispositions. Authors' contracts have come a long way from the
days of lump-sum sale of manuscripts to provide commonly for such a
share except for remaindering, which continues to be a source of cur-
rent author-publisher conflict. 4 Otherwise, control over much of the
print uses territory described above within the concept of use is gener-
ally available to the author now, by law or by contract, in the United
States as elsewhere.
We know that downstream owners under the first sale doctrine now
may make commercial dispositions of the copies they own and pocket
the proceeds without paying any share to the copyright owner. Down-
stream owners, however, are not privileged by section 109(a) or (d) to
exercise any of the section 106 exclusive rights (reproduction, adapta-
tion, performance) other than those of distribution," and in some cases
84. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), (d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also Red Baron-Franklin Park,
Inc. v. Taito Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1548 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming that exhaustion of the copyright
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under section 109(c), display.8 6 The prospect of organized commercial
rentals of audio recordings by downstream owners triggered the Record
Rental Amendment of 1984, despite policies against restraining aliena-
tion. The threat posed by such activities, along with home-taping, to
the fundamental reproduction right and to the economic returns to au-
thors therefrom was recognized. The Register of Copyrights remarked
in 1984, "[tlhe first sale doctrine was never intended to encourage
growth of a second-hand rental market that may eventually replace a
primary sales market or traditional public performance markets. 8
With these points once more in mind, let us look further at the
possibilities for broadening the distribution right for books and for nar-
rowing its limitations. How far and in what ways should we, or can we
as a practical matter, make additional extensions in favor of a use right
in relation to downstream activities?
First consider commercial activities related to books. In my youth,
I can recall, there were establishments in the United States that rented
best-selling and other perennially popular books for a small sum as part
of their general business activities. To my knowledge, the traffic in
book-rentals was not substantial enough to be considered a threat to
the author's sales market. If that is still the case today,88 then ex-
tending the book author's distribution right to cover commercial rental
use is not an urgent priority, though perhaps it should be accomplished
anyway by Congress for safety's sake, if the lack of opposing vested in-
terests is as great as I believe it to be. When literary and dramatic
works are recorded and then rented on a commercial basis by down-
stream owners of the recordinis, such activity should be covered clearly
by the terms of the 1984 Record Rental Amendment.8 " I believe this
clarification could be done without difficulty; it should have been done
except that authors failed to organize and lobby to accomplish it.
Then there is the second-hand or used book market in which
money is made by the second-hand dealer without payment of any
share to the authors. The Honorable David Ladd, when serving as Reg-
ister of Copyrights, remarked that this market "has existed since the
beginning of printing. . .[and] has never been perceived as a threat to
the sale of new copies of the work." "The major reason for this," he
owner's disribution right does not per se impair the owner's other rights under the copyright law,
in particular his or her performance rights).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (Supp. V 1987).
87. Audio and Video Rental Hearing, supra note 20, at 28-29 (prepared statement of David
Ladd, Register of Copyrights and Assistant Librarian for Copyright Services, Library of Congress).
88. See id. at 28 (agreeing that a market has not developed for the commercial lending of
books).
89. At present, such recordings are not expressly and plainly included. See supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
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added, "seems to be that the public prefers to purchase unused books:
the second-hand copy generally is not competitive with an unused book.
In the case of videocassette rentals, the same product is being rented as
is sold. The competition is direct."90 If this statement is true and
secondhand disposition is not used as a device to avoid paying fair com-
pensation to authors, it seems unnecessary to extend the distribution
right to cover such sales. It might be a traumatic change to put second-
hand bookstores, including the bookstalls along the Seine, undei, autho-
rial control. Remaindering of books by publishers may resemble second-
hand selling; proceeds often are not shared with the authors.
Remaindering is still a bone of contention between authors and pub-
lishers. Authors' societies are pressing this issue and contractual ar-
rangements may be worked out to satisfy both parties and curb
reported abuses.9 1 If not, some legislative provision barring publisher
90. Audio and Video Rental Hearing, supra note 20, at 28 (prepared statement of David
Ladd).
91. The Authors Guild Recommended Trade Book Contract and accompanying Guide now
deal with publishers' sales of overstock of hardcover books. Increased and evolving remaindering
activity by publishers involves closing out stocks below cost with no royalty due the author under
most contracts, either when the remaindered copies are sold off to remainder dealers by the pub-
lishers or are sold to the public by such dealers. The Authors Guild Contract now recommends the
following contractual provision:
There shall be no sale of overstock (i.e., copies sold in the United States at 70% discount
or more) during the first 18 months after publication. Thereafter, or sooner with Author's
consent, Publisher may sell overstock and shall pay Author 10% of the gross price received,
provided, (i) Publisher will give Author 30 days notice and guarantee that Author may match
the highest bid of the remainder house for the copies to be remaindered or for any portion
thereof, and (ii) if the purchaser is a firm owned or affiliated in any way with Publisher,
Author will be paid 10% of the price at which copies are resold by the purchaser. Upon Pub-
lisher's complete remaindering of the Work, U.S. hardcover trade publishing rights and U.S.
hardcover reprint rights shall revert to Author.
THE AUTHORS GUILD, INC., THE AUTHORS GUILD RECOMMENDED TRADE BOOK CONTRACT 9 (1987).
The Guide to the Model Contract states:
This clause sets out that authors must be compensated for every book sold, even if sold
at or below manufacturing cost. Remaindered books are sold to consumers at a range of from
one-half to one-tenth the retail list price. An alternative to receiving 10% of the gross price
received for sale would be to require the remainder house to pay the author the previously
contracted hardcover percentage of the new retail price it sets on the book, or to renegotiate
percentages with the author.
In the Winter of 1987, one publisher announced that it would pay its authors a royalty of
5% of the net amount it receives on remainder sales of hardcover adult books and that one of
the remainder houses to which the publisher sells will give 5% to the publisher of what it
pays for the publisher's books, as royalty to the authors.
The author may prefer to purchase the copies to be remaindered and arrange for
distribution.
THE AUTHORS GUILD, INC., GUIDE TO THE AUTHORS GUILD TRADE BOOK CONTRACT 22 (1987). Note
that in 1984 another publisher had announced that its newly-formed subsidiary, Retriever Books,
which removes hard covers from remaindered books it purchases and remarkets them as trade
paperbacks, would pay the publisher and author standard royalties on copies sold, plus a modest
advance.
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disposition of books for money without paying some share of proceeds
to the authors might well be considered.
Many of the noncommercial dispositions of books by downstream
owners do not seem appropriate to include in any right of use. Thus,
the buyer of a novel should have many rights of use, including reading
it alone, nonpublic reading to others, lending it to family or friends or
even strangers,92 fair use quotation of nonsubstantial portions (with
credit, if the quotation is in published form and in print), plus discuss-
ing, criticizing, and storing. It seems to me that the buyer of a novel
should have the right to annotate, sell, give away, bequeath, lend, or
store his copy or even perhaps to rent his book to another if this is not
done as part of a rental business. Likewise, if the downstream owner's
copy is sold as part of disposal of a private library or book collection,
the same rights should apply.
The lending of books by libraries is a major noncommercial activity
on a scale that almost certainly cuts substantially into sales on behalf
of, and remuneration to, authors. Awareness of this practice has led a
number of nations not including the United States to establish a public
lending right. 3 It is not my purpose to review here the growth and the
varieties of lending rights that have emerged, or their respective merits,
other than to say the principle has appeal but its implementation gives
pause. One might enter a caveat that the practical results of these lend-
ing right schemes for many authors raise questions, which may be an-
swerable, about the economic costs of the system in relation to its yield
below the top tiers of already prospering authors. It seems questionable,
too, why the returns, very modest in many cases, are often devoted, in
part at least, to social benefit purposes, though perhaps the strengthen-
ing of authors' societies would be a justifiable expenditure. Arguably,
the lending right is of more symbolic than economic importance. It
seems regrettable that these plans rarely include payments for works
other than books, or payments to foreign authors, though the latter sug-
gestion raises considerations of reciprocity. Do not such problems of
reciprocity profoundly affect the viability of international copyright
generally and the attitudes of nations depending on whether they are
net importers or exporters of printed works? I am in no position to
complain that United States authors are not paid for such uses by other
nations, because Congress does not provide for lending fees to any au-
92. It would be interesting to know whether the reported Swedish ban on private lending of a
copy outside the private circle, without the author's consent, is enforceable and enforced. See Des-
urmont, supra note 1, at 42-44, reprinted in 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs at 495.
93. See, e.g., Dworkin, Public Lending Right-The UK Experience, 13 COLuM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 49 (1988); Note, Closing the Book on the Public Lending Right, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (1988);
Seemann, A Look at the Public Lending Right, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 71 (1983).
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thors, foreign or domestic, and seems unlikely to do so. Congress re-
mains unpersuaded to appropriate large sums for the public lending
right, especially in a period of grave national deficit. It will take sus-
tained, organized, effective pressure over time by authors and their al-
lies to move the Congress in this direction. I do not see such movement
as imminent, though the Authors Guild will continue to mount a sub-
stantial effort to achieve recognition of a public lending right.9 4
One final observation on novels is that compared with periodicals
and sheet music, their sales have suffered comparatively little so far
from the tide of home-copying and home-taping. Copying an entire
novel at home is too laborious to compensate for the ease of buying an
attractive book for a relatively low cost, in paperback at least. With the
development of scanning and print-out equipment, among other things,
the computer age may well change this long stable area in the very near
future. It has not done so yet, though we should plan now for the fore-
seeable electronic possibilities; many electronic publishers are now
making such plans.
Let me turn from novels to deal briefly with texts or other nonfic-
tion books, books of short stories, and periodicals. In each of these clas-
ses of works, there is substantial public demand to use extracts,
particular chapters, stories, or articles, short enough so that (unlike the
full-length work of fiction) the advent of private (or even nonprivate or
governmental) or home-copying technology is a major threat to the
sales that make publication economically feasible. The same fate has
befallen much sheet music and reproductions of works of art. For exam-
ple, I can testify from personal experience in music publishing that
photocopying of the entire work of sheet music for choral singing, espe-
cially by churches and educational establishments, almost has halved a
category of sales that was once a mainstay of the music publishing busi-
ness and a boon to the composers of such music. Such wholesale unau-
thorized copying, beyond the copyright owner's control and not
permitted by the distribution right even as restricted by the first sale
right, has made vast inroads into the viability of both the reproduction
and distribution rights and other core authors' rights. It has caused
deep damage to the publishers who serve authors. In the United States,
the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a private effort of collective ad-
ministration that licenses copying of printed matter, is making a great
effort to recover some lost ground, at least for the book publishing
industry.9 5
94. See, e.g., Meltzer, Steps Guild Members Can Take to Promote ALR in the U.S., Au-
THORS GUILD BULL. 27-28 (Winter 1987).
95. The CCC is participating in the internationalization of that effort through the Interna-
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Some years ago, with shocking callousness and a refusal to consider
new technology in its interpretation of the copyright laws, the United
States Supreme Court divided equally and thus refused to impose legal
sanctions in a case in which wholesale photocopying of medical journals
by government agencies had been judicially approved as fair use.98 Sec-
tion 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act and the Guidelines for Educators,
together with the fair use doctrine, still leave too much room for dam-
aging copying. 7 The Supreme Court seems to defer to Congress, as a
matter of general policy, when new technology issues arise. This prac-
tice is a disaster for copyright interests, leaving them at the mercy of a
Congress in which they have one of the least powerful voices. Collective
licensing action would be the best solution to rescue authors' reproduc-
tion and distribution rights in the printed word, in printed music, and
in the reproduction of art works. Resulting antitrust problems should
be dealt with by new legislation.99 If commercial rental rights can be
enacted, they should be considered for nonfiction books. If "public
lending rights" are obtainable, they should include not only all books,
but also printed music, records, and all other forms of protected artistic
work loaned by public and private libraries, or other institutions, to the
public or to each other.
In sum, concerning books, periodicals, sheet music, and some works
of art, I believe some steps can and should be taken toward a droit de
destination or a use right, but that any claim to a right of use must be
qualified in ways I have indicated to be realistically "saleable" and fair
to authors and all who must live under the rules.
C. Music
Distribution of music in printed form has been discussed already to
some degree in conjunction with books. As in the context of books, giv-
ing composers, authors, and publishers control over commercial rental
tional Federation of Reproduction Rights Organizations.
96. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (4-4 decision), aff'g per
curiam, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
97. Cf. Address by Ralph Oman, U.S. Copyright Office Research on Current Problems in
Reprography (Photocopying) Under United States Law (ATRIP Conference, Washington D.C.
July 27, 1988), reprinted in Oman, The Register's Second Report: An Update on Library Photo-
copying, 13 COLuM-VLA J.L. & ARTS 39 (1988).
98. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 431
(1984).
99. See Kernochan, supra note 44, at 398-99, reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 355
(noting the problems caused by application of the existing antitrust laws to artists). Canada's new
amendments to its Copyright Act seem to move in the direction of reducing antitrust barriers to
collective licensing. See An Act to Amend the Copyright Act and to Amend Other Acts in Conse-




of protected sheet music might be considered. What sort of opposition
there might be, I do not know. The sale of second-hand or used music,
as a business, probably is similar in present impact to that in the book
area. But a right of use, broadly taken, would encompass control over
distribution or dissemination of music in other forms as well. If music is
recorded, the compulsory license of section 115 makes an inroad on any
right of use. After the first recording, the license triggers the first sale
doctrine and takes control from the copyright owner of the work re-
corded, except as the Record Rental Amendment of 1984 restores some
control in the area of commercial rentals to the copyright owners of the
sound recording and the musical works recorded.100 The uses and distri-
butions of video cassettes are not protected in this way, and the distri-
butions made possible by home-taping should be addressed, opposition
notwithstanding. Recordings, we saw, like books and printed music or
drama, can be lent by libraries, or sold off or otherwise disposed of by
individual or other record owners in a second-hand market.1 1 They
may be sold off cheaply by record companies without royalties when cut
from a catalog in a manner similar to remaindering in the book trade;
this practice should be addressed at least by contract. Beyond the Rec-
ord Rental Amendment of 1984 and home-taping tax legislation,102 it
would seem difficult to extend control or compensation for distribution
of recordings much farther into the zone of use here. The supplemen-
tary, problematic, and hard-to-achieve public lending right option also
deserves study.
Distribution of performances apart from recordings falls somewhat
outside my focus. Live or broadcast or in synchronization with film, this
category falls largely in the domain of the very active performing rights
societies and the mechanical licensing organizations. 03 Copying and re-
cording technology make their practical inroads here too, and Congress
has not been able to resist calls for a number of unjustified exemptions
to performance rights.' 0 4
D. Drama
An area of interest, insufficiently examined, is that of grand rights
in dramatic or dramatico-musical works. For a long time authors and
publishers of such works have relied substantially, as section 109(a) al-
100. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102. Bills to establish home-taping tax legislation have been proposed, but none has been
enacted so far. See, e.g., S. 33, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S90 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983);
H.R. 1027, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H201 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983).
103. See Kernochan, supra note 44, at 398, reprinted in 10 COLu-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 355.
104. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(6), (10), 111, 116, 118 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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lows, on not relinquishing title to the embodiments of the works in or-
der to retain control under the section 106(3) distribution right. Often
the materials of plays or operas or musical shows have been made avail-
able only through rentals. Before the reprographic revolution, control
was retained over distribution to a reasonable degree because these
materials typically were voluminous and too laborious to copy. That era
has ended for at least two reasons. First, it is now easy and not prohibi-
tively expensive for renters to photocopy these rental materials for their
own and others' future use. That practice is in fact infringement, how-
ever, and the law covers it without any new steps needed toward exten-
sion of a right of use. Such photocopying still opens a de facto breach in
control over distribution that is difficult to remedy in practice. Second,
grand rights works, though not subject to compulsory licensing, are now
available on records. Sales of recordings, although a logical, desirable
marketing avenue, exhaust the physical distribution right. This practice
opens the door to distribution or dissemination by public performance
and broadcast that in the United States, at least, is not monitored or
policed adequately by existing machinery, though such machinery could
be established. Authors want, need, and, I think, deserve control over
primary performances and recordings, along with collective administra-
tion to monitor and collect for broadcast or secondary uses of the pri-
mary authorized performances. Existing law seems adequate to support
this proposal without extending the right of distribution very much.
Consideration might be given to providing that sale of phonorecords or
printed copies to performing groups for performance will not trigger
section 109(a) if copies bear warning notices. Special antitrust exemp-
tion for collective action by authors is needed here as elsewhere. Of
course, if dramatic or dramatico-musical works are sold in book form,
they are subject to the first sale doctrine. A clarification on the prohibi-
tion of unauthorized commercial rentals of such works to the public,
both in printed and recorded form, might be considered in relation to
the Record Rental Amendment of 1984.105 It would be proper to inquire
whether the second-hand sales market is significant and needs
attention.
E. Film
Films made for the theatre in the United States generally are
leased in their various noncassette phases of domestic and foreign ex-
ploitation: chiefly pay-per-view cable; monthly subscription pay cable;
network broadcast; and syndicated broadcast, with or without satellite
complexities. This practice ensures that the distribution right is not le-
105. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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gally lost. It may be lost, however, as a practical matter through pirated
and off-the-air copying, or by careless transfer of title to prints. Alas,
the sale of videocassettes changes all that, so that video rental legisla-
tion that will compensate for increases in video home-taping seems an
essential extension of the distribution right in the direction of a right of
use, despite heavy foreseeable opposition. Libraries' rentals of protected
films should be covered by any public lending right obtainable.
F. Visual Art (Painting and Sculpture)
As a final illustration, I would add a word about visual art, specifi-
cally, painting and sculpture. Unless an artist has such rare prestige
that he or she could exact rental arrangements rather than sale arrange-
ments, he or she probably must submit to the traditional sale mode of
marketing unique or limited-supply art works. In the United States,
upon sale, there is a consequent and sometimes serious loss of artistic
and economic control over the future of the work, especially if weak
bargaining power means the artist must yield the copyright along with
the object. United States museums, I think unfairly, are demanding
some or all copyright rights without royalty obligations when purchas-
ing art. Collective effort is needed here. Attempts by artists to exert
continuing control, through the so-called Projansky and Jurrist con-
tracts, 06 have been vehemently resisted and rarely accepted by dealers,
collectors, and museums. The main avenue for actual or potential com-
pensation for the work of visual artists remains distribution by sale or
by rental of the original or reproductions. An organized arts community
should follow the example of the Record Rental Amendment and lobby
for revenues from rental of originals or visual or audiovisual reproduc-
tions. Library lending of visual artworks should be included in any fu-
ture public lending right scheme.
Display of art is more problematic. Because original art works are
unique, or nearly so, the first sale is crucial for the artist's direct com-
pensation unlike the first sale of the book writer who trades on multi-
ples. To make up for this difference, a number of countries and the
State of California have adopted the droit de suite,0 7 or resale right,
which provides for a payment to the artist on resale. In only a few of
106. See F. FELDMAN, S. WEIL & S. BIEDERMAN, ART LAW 556-58, 572-76 (1986).
107. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). Nations that have enacted
artists' resale right legislation include: Algeria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Ecuador, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Mad-
agascar, Mali, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay,
West Germany, and Yugoslavia. See generally L. Pierredon-Fawcett, Le Droit de Suite en




these cases has this scheme been successful. The impact of the right is
at best erratic. Its opponents say it is unsatisfactory because it only
enriches the rich without helping the poorer artist. Copyright, however,
generally fails to provide start-up capital. It tends to reward popularity,
which may or may not coincide with quality. Note that individual na-
tions may be unwilling to adopt the resale right for fear of losing valua-
ble art sales to nations that impose no such tax on transfers. The pros
and cons are fully and carefully reviewed elsewhere and the conclusion
reached that the right has value and is workable, if properly imple-
mented, seems hard to rebut.10 8 The California right received much
criticism.109 A bill proposed by Senator Edward Kennedy, 110 which
would establish, among other things, an artists resale right on a na-
tional level in the United States, as must be done if it is to be truly
effective, also received much criticism.1 One feasible step, though it
faces daunting opposition, is for the United States to extend the distri-
bution right in the direction of a use right and to limit the first sale
doctrine. This step may require coordinated action with other nations,
and certainly will call for effective collective activity by United States
artists, with attendant antitrust risks.
Although a few countries, including the United States, have a dis-
play right, 1 2 I have not found any record that it has had a significant
effect anywhere. Perhaps the idea could and should be pursued fur-
108. See L. Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 107.
109. See, e.g., McInerney, California Resale Royalties Act: Private Sector Enforcement, 19
U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1984).
110. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S11,502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987).
111. See, e.g., Note, Artists' Rights in the United States: Toward Federal Legislation, 25
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 153 (1988). The Kennedy bill, after bruising hearings, was reported out in re-
vised form by the appropriate Senate subcommittee. As of August 10, 1988, the revised bill has
dropped previous provisions for an artists resale right (droit de suite) and calls for study of this
problem. In sum, it would:
Create a new Section 106(a) in the Copyright Act to give unwaivable and unassignable
rights of paternity and integrity to authors of works of visual art;
Permit an author to claim or disclaim authorship of publicly displayed works, and to
bring infringement actions when such works are mutilated or altered;
Permit authors of works of recognized stature to bring such infringement actions, and
grant them certain rights of integrity against removal of their works;
Call for a joint study by the Register of Copyrights and the National Endowment for the
Arts on allowing visual artists to share monetarily in the enhanced value of their work;
Preempt state moral rights laws;
Exempt normal conservation from actionable mutilation, and exempt works for hire from
paternity and integrity rights.
S. 1619, supra note 110. For a criticism of the resale right by economists, see Bolch, Damon &
Hinshaw, An Economic Analysis of the California Art Royalty Statute, 10 CONN. L. REV. 689
(1978).
112. Chile, Ecuador, Germany, Peru, and Portugal provide for a right of exhibition or dis-
play. L. Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 107, at 57 n.84.
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ther.n 3 In England, I learned that exhibitors, though not required to do
so, sometimes make ex gratia payments to exhibited artists."' I doubt
this practice is a source of significant artistic compensation. To have
such a right in the United States, as urged by some scholars, 1 5 would
require amendments to section 109, that ubiquitous barrier to a droit
de destination or right of use. Section 109(c) undercuts the right of dis-
play given in section 106(5) and seriously hampers the right of artists to
control in any way, except as to audiovisual use, the exploitation of a
transferred work via displays. The interrelations between sections
106(5) and 109(c) were not adequately thought through. Artists have a
right of display in section 106(5) if they retain copyright, but no right of
access or borrowing for display is provided in section 109(c) or else-
where once they part with title. Owners of title on the other hand have
full rights not to display, or to display at the place where the work is
located-i.e., to all comers at exhibitions or otherwise. The title-holder
may not, however, allow display on television or film without the con-
sent of and probably compensation to the artist unless the title-holder
is also copyright owner. If the experience of display-right nations, 116 or
some proposed new shaping of that right, suggests that the artist's con-
trol, perhaps nonexclusive, of display of a transferred work is feasible
and profitable without undue transaction costs, it should be explored as
a possibly desirable extension of the artists' rights.
Rights in reproductions can be vital to the compensation and liveli-
hood of visual artists. Because in the United States this basic right
often is surrendered in contracts through ignorance or weak bargaining
power, there is a special need for strengthened collective organization
and resistance by artists to bad bargains or, alternatively, a need for
remedial legislation requiring proportional sharing of the revenues from
this source. Here, being played out once again, is the historic, centuries-
old struggle of creators to progress from lump-sum payments to the
royalties or residuals that enable them to share in the profits earned
from their labors.
VI. REFLECTIONS ON REFORM
From the descriptions of United States law and the selective com-
ments regarding particular areas of the arts, can we extract some gen-
eral observations about the major avenues of reform in our effort to
113. See generally Goetzl & Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right: A
New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 15 (1984).
114. Interview with the Design Artists Copyright Society Ltd. in London, England (Oct.
1987).
115. See generally Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 113.
116. See supra note 112.
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define and achieve a droit de destination in some measure approaching
a right of use? Three general observations seem plausible.
1. I think it is clear that in the United States an effort to secure
from Congress a blanket patent-style right of use in lieu of our present
distribution right would not be successful and would be unwise policy.
There are too many necessary exceptions to such a right to make a
claim to it plausible and politically achievable. Seeking a right so
broadly phrased will appear naive or overreaching or both. The claim-
ant risks being dismissed at the threshold before the case is heard.
2. It would seem better for the United States to clarify the priority
needs in moving toward extension of existing rights to make up for
technological erosion and to disclaim expressly areas not claimed within
the broad right of use. In other words we must define clearly what is
sought, since we must chip away at existing barriers and have not the
luxury of resting on broad principle from which others must seek
subtractions.
3. If this approach is desirable for the United States, we should
concentrate our efforts at expansion on some urgent matters of
concern.
117
a. We need a virtually full-fledged right of use for unpublished
works.""
b. An expanded Record Rental Amendment is necessary; it should
include recorded literary, dramatic, and musico-dramatic works not
limited by the section 115 compulsory license.1 9 Control over commer-
cial rental of original or reproduced visual artworks should also be con-
sidered, and the possible opposition weighed.
c. We should have a new video rental bill covering not only films
but all kinds of protected creative works that may be embodied in video
recordings. 20 United States Copyright Office testimony at hearings on
the home audio and video taping bills provided a telling metaphor to
support the concept. Ms. Dorothy Schrader, Associate Register of
Copyrights for Legal Affairs, spoke in behalf of the audio and video
rental bills and urged that the rental problems illustrate:
the need to accommodate copyright to the shifts in market realities caused by ad-
vantageous new technologies. If rentals are moving the film theater to the home,
the copyright box office must follow in order to recoup investments and secure the
rewards previously taken in at the theater box office. This relocation of the box
office is necessary to provide a stream of support flowing back to distributors, ac-
tors, producers, studios, scenarists, and the entire industry and all the workers who
117. Accord Desurmont, supra note 1.
118. See supra Part IV.
119. See supra note 89.
120. See, e.g., supra Part VE.
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created the movies. 2 '
The Betamax case,122 which removed the pressures on Congress, and
the strong opposition by tape and tape machine makers to any pay-
ment, seem to presage a long, uncertain struggle for any such legislative
solution. To secure this solution there must be an effective army of or-
ganized author groups and their supporters. A more persuasive argu-
ment must be made to the Congress that, as in the area of audio
recordings, the thriving video industry, and more particularly, the crea-
tive elements, need this added protection to make up for revenues lost
to home-taping.
d. We need legislation to compensate for private or institutional
taping and its inroads on sales to the public.12 Many European coun-
tries have moved in this direction. Here, too, a great and organized ef-
fort will be needed in the United States. Once more, the concept of
"moving the box office" applies, and one might also analogize, to the
development of the notion of enterprise liability in United States tort
law governing compensation for injury from defective products. 2 " A
1963 New York case 2" described enterprise liability as intending
to remove the economic consequences of accidents from the victim who is unpre-
pared to bear them and place the risk on the enterprise in the course of whose
business they arise. The risk, it is said, becomes part of the cost of doing business
and can be effectively distributed among the public through insurance or by a di-
rect reflection in the price of the goods or service.1 26
In this analogy, the creators and their commercial partners are, of
course, the "victims" to be compensated for loss of revenues, but the
economic case for such legislation will have to be very persuasive
against heavy and powerful opposition.
e. Provisions for private institutional copying of print material are
needed. It seems possible that collective administration, if supported
properly by publishers and authors of books, periodicals, music, etc.,
can provide a viable solution.2 7 The CCC already seems to have made
significant headway, although it still has far to go. Visual artists' socie-
ties must join this effort for greater strength or proceed independently.
121. First Sale Doctrine Hearings, supra note 20, at 357 (prepared statement of Dorothy
Schrader); see id. at 366-67; Audio and Video Rental Hearing, supra note 20, at 21-24 (prepared
statement of David Ladd).
122. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see
supra notes 66 & 98.
123. See supra note 20.
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963).
126. Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (Burke, J., dissenting).
127. See supra note 99.
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f. Finally, we need public lending rights, the droit de suite, and
perhaps a stronger display right supplemented perhaps by legislative
provisions which would call for a sharing with artists of proceeds from
reproduction, as well as from commercial distribution of artworks by
rental or loan. These measures are all steps to be considered in the ef-
fort to enhance distribution rights.12 '8 They seem, in varying degrees,
quite distant from legislative realization in the United States and other
countries and from effective practical realization even in many of the
nations where they are, in principle, recognized by law. Viability and
economic consequences are key questions. Once more, organization of
artists to fight for justifiable rights is essential, as the opposition is
strong. The existing exclusively domestic focus of many of these devices
in other nations should be made general and international when their
adoption is socially and economically supportable.
I can only hope that a few of these preliminary reflections will con-
tribute in some positive way to a reasoned extension of reproduction or
distribution rights in the United States and elsewhere. Such extensions
are essential to cope with the tidal wave, a veritable tsunami, of tech-
nology that threatens to drown the fragile but infinitely precious au-
thors' rights whose welfare concerns so many of us so profoundly.
128. See supra Part VF.
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